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A New Understanding of the American  
Energy Crisis of the 1970s 
Robert D. Lifset ∗ 
Abstract: »Eine neue Interpretation der U.S.-amerikanischen Energiekrise der 
1970er Jahre«. The energy crisis of the 1970s in the United States consisted of 
three separate but related problems in the oil, natural gas, and utility sectors of 
the energy economy. The OPEC price increases and the OAPEC embargo of 1973 
merely exacerbated existing problems. This article traces these problems over 
several decades and their development into a crisis in the early 1970s. 
Keywords: Energy, energy crisis, energy policy, energy history, oil, natural gas, 
electricity, 1970s. 
1.  Introduction 
A growing body of scholars has come to view the 1970s as a pivotal decade in 
American history.1 This scholarship has identified the 1970s as ushering in 
fundamental transformations in American cultural, political and economic life. 
These changes took place in a nation experiencing and trying to recover from a 
series of political assassinations, the end of the Vietnam War, Watergate, eco-
nomic decline and inflation.2 Within this scholarship, the energy crisis of the 
1970s has often been interpreted as an oil crisis brought about by an embargo 
by OAPEC, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. A cartel 
comprised of Third World nations successfully wreaked havoc on the Ameri-
can economy. As such, the energy crisis is taken as symbolic of national de-
cline. This understanding of the energy crisis of the 1970s is not entirely accu-
rate. This paper argues that this is an overly simplistic understanding of the 
changes taking place within the energy economy of the United States in the 
1970s. What was the energy crisis of the 1970s?  
                                                          
∗  Robert D. Lifset, Honors College, University of Oklahoma, 1300 Asp Avenue, Norman, OK 
73019, USA; robertlifset@ou.edu. 
1  For their critical comments and insight I want to thank the participants at the “Energy Crisis 
of the 1970s as Challenges to the Industrialized World” conference, the Honors College fac-
ulty seminar at the University of Oklahoma, and Rüdiger Graf. 
2  For surveys and edited volumes that examine the decade see Bailey and Farber 2004; Killen 
2006; Ferguson et al. 2010; Stein 2010; Cowie 2010; Sandbrook 2011; Schulman 2002; Bor-
stelmann 2011. 
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The energy crisis in the United States consisted of three separate but related 
developments that were often lumped together as part of one energy crisis in 
contemporary discourse. First, there existed an oil crisis. This is the familiar 
story of a sudden spike in prices and gasoline lines. Second, there was an 
equally serious natural gas crisis characterized by physical shortages. Finally, a 
crisis in the electrical utility sector caused several major publicly regulated 
monopolies to teeter on the brink of bankruptcy during the decade. This paper 
defines an energy crisis as the onset of physical shortages in the form of gaso-
line lines, insufficient natural gas supply, and widespread and consistent black-
outs or the bankruptcy (or near-bankruptcy) of publicly regulated utility mo-
nopolies. The problems that produced these crises were themselves sometimes 
described as crises years before the shortages materialized. But the term “cri-
sis” has become so ubiquitous and politically useful, that its presence in the 
political discourse is an unreliable means by which to define a particular period 
of time as experiencing an energy crisis. 
This paper will argue that the United States would have experienced an oil 
crisis, a natural gas crisis and an electrical utility crisis with or without the 
OAPEC embargo. The embargo chiefly exacerbated and overshadowed exist-
ing problems in the energy economy.3 This paper will focus on the post-World 
War II years leading up to the OAPEC oil embargo of 1973. In doing so it 
seeks to diagnose the problems plaguing the US energy economy. This will 
allow us to see more clearly both the reaction of American energy policy and 
politics in that decade and its contribution to the larger transformations in the 
political and economic life of the country.  
2.  The Oil Crisis 
On a cold January morning in 1974, Mary Korechoff swung her delivery van in 
front of Frank Knight’s blue paneled truck. They were waiting on a gas line at a 
Mobil station on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Mr. Knight, who 
used his truck to deliver rugs, was two hours behind schedule and had been 
waiting in line for forty-five minutes. “The hell with her,” he said as he swung 
his truck onto the sidewalk and, after maneuvering between some parked cars, 
cut back into his rightful place in line. Ms. Korechoff, a carpenter also making 
deliveries, was unapologetic. “In my case it’s either gas or welfare. I need the 
gas and I need the time.”4 For Korechoff, Knight, and many other Americans in 
the 1970s, there was a good deal of anger and frustration at their inability to 
                                                          
3  There is some scholarship from the 1970s and ’80 that interprets the energy crisis as an oil 
and natural gas crisis but does not link that to an analysis of the electrical utility crisis. For 
examples, see Stobaugh and Yergin 1979; Greenberger 1983; Tugwell 1988. 
4  ‘Drivers Waiting to Fill Empty Tanks’ 1974. 
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secure adequate supplies of a commodity that many had never expected to 
become scarce. They were experiencing the oil crisis: an oil shortage that pro-
duced gasoline lines. To understand precisely how Mary Korechoff and Frank 
Knight found themselves fighting to get gasoline, this paper will look for an-
swers not in events in the Middle East, but in the structure and nature of the 
American oil market. For here we will find a market on the brink of crisis sev-
eral months before the OAPEC embargo.  
In 1930, two giant new oil fields were discovered in the mid-continent oil 
region of the United States. The Oklahoma City field and the East Texas field 
put tremendous quantities of new oil on the market at the very moment that the 
Great Depression was reducing demand.5 As prices plunged below the cost of 
production, the industry faced a crisis of unprecedented scale. In response, by 
the mid-1930s, a system emerged in which the oil-producing states would 
ration allowable production quotas to existing oil fields within their territories. 
In Texas, the nation’s largest oil-producing state, this system was administered 
by the Texas Railroad Commission. This system of pro-rationing was keyed to 
estimates of domestic demand forecast by the federal government.6  
This restructuring of the domestic oil market served several purposes. First, 
it put a hard floor beneath oil prices, thereby reducing volatility. In Figure 1 we 
can see a stable US (and world) oil market in which US regulatory authorities 
(and the international majors) carefully matched supply and demand. Second, 
the policy protected independent oil producers, smaller in size but greater in 
number and political influence.7 This ensured the survival of an independent oil 
industry and avoided the concentration of the nation’s oil business in the hands 
of a small number of companies. Finally, there was a national security argu-
ment. Independents in support of pro-rationing and the restriction of imports, 
suggested that a reliance on foreign oil supplies created a strategic weakness 
that could be exploited in time of war. Alternatively, this argument could be 
turned on its head as the international majors argued that increasing imports 
                                                          
5  On the east Texas field see Hinton and Olien 2002, 167-92; on the Oklahoma City field see 
Lifset, “A City Built By and on Oil: The March of the Mud Hogs and Derricks in Depression-
Era Oklahoma City” (unpublished paper, in the author’s possession).  
6  Oklahoma began experimenting with pro-rationing as a conservation reform justified by 
fears of an impending oil shortage as early as 1915. Texas followed soon thereafter. But be-
cause the rule of capture weakened the price signal of oil, significant new discoveries in 
1930 threatened the viability of the industry. Now pro-rationing was defended as a measure 
to protect price. For a detailed history of oil conservation and early pro-rationing efforts in 
Texas see Malavis 1996; see also Clark 1987, 151-2, 195-6; Nash 1968, 113-56; Rister 1949, 
368-77. 
7  “Independent producers” is a term generally referring to oil companies that were not de-
scended from Standard Oil and did not grow to become one of the “majors” (i.e. Texaco and 
Gulf). Generally, independents were focused on the exploration for and production (and 
sometimes refining) of oil and did not engage in the transportation or retail ends of the 
business. 
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preserved the domestic production capacity of the United States, thereby insur-
ing that the US would have access to oil in any future conflict.  
The cost of this effort was the market distorting effects of what became a 
politically controlled oil market. Over time, the price of domestically sold oil in 
the US rose above world prices (see Figure 1). As it did, the US market became 
an increasingly attractive commercial opportunity for those companies that 
could produce oil overseas and import it into the United States.  
Figure 1:  Crude Oil Prices from 1949 to 1980 
 
Sources: World Oil Prices: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2013. U.S. Oil Prices: U.S. 
Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 5.18. Conversions from nominal prices were 
made using the U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics' Inflation Calculator. 
 
Left uncontrolled, growing imports of cheap foreign oil could significantly 
damage the independent oil producers in the domestic oil industry. Cheap for-
eign oil was long recognized as a threat that could upset the political and eco-
nomic calculus necessary for pro-rationing to function. This was not a problem 
in the early 1940s as the Second World War generated enough demand to cre-
ate a relatively tight international oil market. However, after the war the inter-
national oil companies began to significantly increase their imports. Between 
1947 and 1949 foreign oil imports more than doubled (from 2.7 percent to 6.2 
percent of total supply), while domestic production declined. By 1959 imports 
accounted for nearly 12 percent of total supply.8  
This imported oil was not meeting new domestic demand. The imported oil 
was instead taking business from the domestic oil industry as pro-rationing 
authorities (i.e. the Texas Railroad Commission) ordered reductions in produc-
tion. Ernest Thompson, chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission, testified 
that the daily average import volume corresponded almost precisely with re-
ductions in Texas allowables. The Texas Railroad Commission protected the 
                                                          
8  Williamson et al. 1963, 810.  
HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  26 
existing price structure and then, with its allies, went to the federal government 
to lobby for restrictions on the importation of oil.9 After a period of voluntary 
import quotas failed, President Eisenhower established a mandatory quota 
system in 1959 and justified doing so as a national security measure. Foreign 
oil was to be restricted to meeting 12 percent of domestic demand.10 Since it 
was politically unpalatable for the federal government to administer the pro-
gram in a manner that protected and advanced the market share of the large 
international oil companies, the oil import quota was administered in a fashion 
that favored smaller and independent producers and refiners. This was accom-
plished by freezing and then reducing historical import quotas to make room for 
smaller companies. The program also included an exchange program for inland 
refiners (which would never naturally be in a position to import oil), and a sliding 
scale, which was designed to grant disproportionally large quotas to small refin-
ers. Inland refiners argued that if permits were restricted to actual importers, their 
cost advantage would drive all the inland refiners out of business.11  
What were the impacts of the Mandatory Oil Import Program? Along with 
pro-rationing, the program helped to establish both a floor and a ceiling on the 
price of oil in the US. It stimulated domestic productive capacity and damp-
ened demand while maintaining a reserve capacity. It kept many independent 
and smaller refiners in business (in the early 1970s there were more than ten 
thousand independent producers and over 130 refiners.).12 But more important-
ly, it prevented the US market from adjusting gradually to the growth of world 
demand and the depletion of US reserves, and by closing off the world’s largest 
oil market it helped to put downward pressure on world oil prices.13 President 
Richard Nixon ended the program in April 1973.14 By then, world oil prices 
                                                          
9  U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Small Business 1949, pt. 1, 958. 
10  Presidential Proclamation 3279, March 10, 1959, 24 FR 1781, March 12, 1959; in a press 
conference the following day not a single question was asked about the imposition of a 
mandatory import quota. Nearly all the questions focused on the growing crisis in Berlin. 
See Eisenhower 1959; In addition to pro-rationing and the import quota, the industry bene-
fitted from favorable tax treatment. The oil depletion allowance is described in a number of 
places most recently in Shulman 2011. 
11  Vietor 1984, 121-40. 
12  Vietor 1984, 214. 
13  The introduction of Soviet oil into the world oil market in the late 1950s and the oil import 
quota pushed the market price below the posted price (a negotiated price between the in-
ternational majors and Middle Eastern nations). This led Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon 
after 1973) to unilaterally reduce the posted price on Arabian Light Crude by fourteen 
cents, a factor in the decision by oil producers to form OPEC. See Venn 2002, 37; Wall 1988, 
600-4. 
14  Proclamation 4210, 38 FR 9645, April 19, 1973; President Nixon established the “Cabinet 
Task Force on Oil Import Control” in March 1969. See “Memorandum from President Nixon 
to Secretary of Labor Shultz.” National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PET 17-2 US; 
The Task Force issued a report “The Oil Import Question; A Report on the Relationship of Oil 
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had nearly reached US prices (see Figure 1), and since there was no additional 
spare production capacity in the US, the nation had reached peak oil production.15 
US domestic production peaked in 1971. In April 1972, the Texas Railroad 
Commission (along with the other state pro-rationing authorities) allowed full 
production.16 It had been a long time in coming, but peak oil production was 
not simply a story of the leveling off of US oil production; it needs to be seen 
in the context of massive increases in domestic oil (and gas) consumption.17 In 
1950 the United States produced 5.9 million barrels of oil per day (bpd). Twen-
ty years later US oil production peaked at 11.6 million bpd. Over that same 
period, US oil consumption rose from 6.4 million to 14.6 million bpd. In 1950 
the country imported 5.5 percent of the oil it consumed; twenty years later that 
figure was 21.5 percent. During those twenty years, oil production doubled, but 
consumption nearly tripled.18 A growing economy, the spread of suburbaniza-
tion, an expansion of auto-mobility (and the de-funding of mass transit), an 
increase in the use of oil for heating (replacing coal) and electricity production, 
and a petro-chemical revolution all served to increase the use of oil.19 Petrole-
um used for transportation grew 131 percent between 1950 and 1970. The 
United States experienced significant growth of oil consumption in commercial 
(85 percent), industrial (109 percent), and residential (114 percent) use.20 This 
can be seen in Figure 2 where a steep rise in consumption only ends in the late 
1970s. When production levels off in the early 1970s, this rising consumption 
is met with new net imports.  
                                                                                                                                
Imports to the National Security” (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) in Febru-
ary 1970. 
15  One study found that the import quota cost consumers $6.2 billion annually in the 1960s 
and produced an annual gain of $3.9 billion to producers and $0.5 billion to refiners. Bur-
rows and Domencich 1970, 168. 
16  U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 5.2.  
17  President Jimmy Carter did define the oil crisis toward the end of the 1970s partly as a 
result of rising consumption, and his administration put into place policies designed to slow 
the growth of oil demand. However, this was politically risky, because it was interpreted as 
blaming the American people for the crisis. While Nixon and Ford supported conservation 
efforts, these efforts would never become the centerpiece of their response to the energy 
crisis. See Mattson 2009; Horowitz 2005. 
18  U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 5.1a.  
19 Historians have devised two primary explanations for the rise in energy consumption in 
post-war America. One view holds that the rise in consumption can best be explained by 
changes in American culture. Another view sees the rise in energy consumption as a result 
of economic and political support. For the former view see Nye 1999; for the latter view see 
Melosi 1985. 
20  U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 5.13a and U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 2012, Table 5.13c. 
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Figure 2: Petroleum and Other Liquids Overview, 1949-2011 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 5.1a. 
 
Spare capacity outside the OPEC cartel was now nearly nonexistent. In these 
new market conditions, OPEC successfully negotiated a series of price increas-
es between 1970 and 1973.21 This served to further the economic nationalism 
of oil producers and Arab nations began to contemplate the possibility of using 
the “oil weapon.”  
At this moment there was a sharp turning point in federal oil policy. For two 
generations the federal government had supported policies that subsidized and 
supported oil producers. Within the four year span from 1971 to1975 the three 
foundations of this support (pro-rationing, the import quota, and the depletion 
allowance) were ended and replaced with price controls that supported refiners 
and consumers at the expense of producers.22  
In the summer of 1971 President Nixon imposed a freeze on all wages and 
prices as part of a larger set of emergency measures designed to fight infla-
tion.23 The price freeze gave way to a series of price controls which were lifted 
in 1974 except for those on oil. With the increases in foreign oil prices negoti-
ated by OPEC, the delivered price of foreign oil caught up with the wellhead 
price of domestic oil in early 1973 (see Figure 1).24 While pro-rationing and 
                                                          
21  A good narrative of how OPEC gained the upper hand in a tighter world oil market can be 
found in Bamberg 2000, 447-89. 
22  The depletion allowance was eliminated for large firms in 1975. It survived for small pro-
ducers at a lower rate.  
23  Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 FR 15727, 1971. 
24  Johnson 1975; the Nixon administration considered price controls necessary because it 
knew a number of economic measures it announced to fight unemployment and interna-
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import quotas were based on regulating physical quantities of oil, price is much 
more ephemeral and, not surprisingly, was more difficult to control without 
quickly creating unintended consequences. One example could be seen almost 
immediately. When Nixon imposed a freeze on prices in the summer of 1971 
gasoline prices were seasonally high while prices for home heating oil were 
seasonally low. With these prices now fixed in place, refiners sought to maxim-
ize their gasoline production at the expense of building up heating oil stocks. 
As a result, shortages of home heating oil materialized during the unseasonably 
cold winter of 1972-1973 that drove up demand. Responding to these shortag-
es, refiners built up heating oil stocks in 1973, resulting in shortages of gaso-
line inventories. This was compounded by the inability of some refiners and 
retailers to secure adequate petroleum supplies, given that the import quota was 
only lifted that April. A survey by the American Automobile Association found 
that 47 percent of gasoline stations were not operating normally in May; by 
June every station in the Northeast had curtailed hours.25 Gasoline shortages 
appeared on the east and west coasts in June of 1973, four months before the 
OAPEC embargo.26  
In this context the OAPEC embargo had a significant impact. Initiated in 
October 1973 and lasting until March 1974, the embargo’s impact was greatest 
in February 1974 (because of the time it took Middle Eastern oil to reach North 
America). In that month, oil imports fell 1.2 million bpd (19 percent) below 
their September levels. Since imports accounted for 34 percent of US consump-
tion, this represented a loss of about 8 percent of the nation’s total supply.27 
This was sufficient to produce the gas lines experienced by Mary Korechoff, 
Frank Knight, and many others. However, it should be noted that the embargo 
impacted a domestic oil market that had already begun to experience shortages. 
Two principal interpretations seeking to understand the oil crisis emerged in 
the 1970s. The first view held that the crisis was a market failure produced by 
policy failure. This critique took several forms. One maintained that the US had 
                                                                                                                                
tional speculation (i.e. fiscal stimulus and the suspension of gold convertibility) would make 
the existing inflation problem worse. Price controls were also very popular. See Waterhouse 
2013. 
25  Hakes 2008, 22. 
26  ‘California Standard Limits Supply’ 1973; ‘Exxon Stations on 2 Toll Roads’ 1973. 
27  Hakes 2008, 35; despite the embargo the United States actually imported more oil from the 
Persian Gulf in 1973 than it did in 1972, this same trend is true of 1974. U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration 2012, Table 5.4; price controls had the effect of capturing a signifi-
cant percentage of the increases in income that would have accrued to domestic oil pro-
ducers in the presence of rising world prices. Between 1974 and 1980 this has been 
estimated to total $14-50 billion per year. Of this total, refiners captured $9-32 billion per 
year and consumers $5-12 billion. The difference between the estimated loss to producers 
and the subsidies to refiners and consumers is the value of economic waste produced by 
larger than optimal levels of petroleum consumption and smaller than optimal levels of 
crude oil production. Kalt 1981, 286-9. 
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a series of fuel policies but no unified energy policy.28 Or energy policies had 
hampered the nation’s ability to smoothly transition from surplus to scarcity.29 
Or that the crisis resulted simply from increasing demand and inadequate sup-
ply (due to import quotas).30 A second view saw the crisis as the result of con-
centration and conspiracy. This view attracted a good deal of support in the 
1970s. The oil crisis was created by the international majors. These companies 
were holding tankers offshore, knowing that the price they could obtain would 
be higher tomorrow than today. The oil companies were manipulating the data 
the government relied upon to make policy.31 A poll conducted in February 
1974 revealed that 73 percent of Americans believed that there was no shortage 
of oil. Many Americans were sure that the energy crisis was a fraud perpetuat-
ed by the oil companies to increase prices.32 
Whether the oil crisis in the US was the result of market forces or conspira-
cy is beyond the purview of this paper. The reality is that shortages appeared 
beginning in the summer of 1973. While the OAPEC embargo contributed to 
the intensity of these shortages, the US oil market was in crisis prior to the 
embargo. 
3.  The Natural Gas Crisis 
In the summer of 1971 the Northern Illinois Gas Company requested permis-
sion from the Illinois Commerce Commission to reduce service to nearly two 
hundred customers by fifty percent for the rest of the year and to eliminate their 
service beginning in 1972.33 “Due to the national gas shortage our natural gas 
pipelines (subsidiaries) have curtailed the gas we can buy from them…we have 
no choice” according to a spokesperson for the company. The decision was 
designed to protect existing supplies for residential customers.34 Along with the 
growing fuel oil shortage, by early 1973 thousands of workers in the upper 
Midwest were laid off or furloughed from their jobs because fuel supplies were 
unavailable. Public schools were closed; in the southern Great Plains, the Uni-
                                                          
28  Kash and Rycroft 1984, 12. 
29  Vietor 1984, 202. 
30  Yergin 1991, 590. 
31  A sampling of this view can be found in Allvine and Patterson 1974; Blair 1976, 235-60; 
Mitchell 2011, 174-7; on the manipulation of data see Wildavsky and Tenenbaum 1981.  
32  Richman 1979, 577. The oil companies grew increasingly unpopular beginning in the 1950s. 
I would argue that this was a result of the growing awareness of the role of Texas oil money 
in funding right-wing politics. On the political contributions of prominent independent oil 
men see Burrough 2009, 229-49; this change in popular perceptions was also reflected in 
the Hollywood-produced movies about oil. See Lifset and Black 2012. 
33  ‘NI-Gas Seeks to Reduce’ 1971. 
34  ‘NI-Gas Seeks to Reduce’ 1971. 
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versity of Texas at Austin postponed the opening of its spring semester for a 
week because it could not heat student dormitories. In short, there existed a 
serious crisis in the natural gas sector of the energy economy ten months to two 
years before the OAPEC embargo.35  
Unlike oil, the price of natural gas had been regulated since the 1960s. This 
came about as a result of a long struggle that began almost as soon as the en-
actment of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 granted the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC) the authority to regulate interstate natural gas pipelines.36 While the law 
itself did not explicitly give the FPC authority over natural gas producers, the 
industry lobbied Congress to pass a law exempting producers from FPC over-
sight. President Truman vetoed it in 1950.37 The industry then obtained an 
opinion from the FPC itself (which as a test case chose to examine Phillips 
Petroleum, the largest natural gas producer in the nation) declaring that it did 
not have jurisdiction over natural gas producers.38 The state of Wisconsin ap-
pealed the FPC’s decision, and in June of 1954 the United States Supreme 
Court decided that Phillips was a natural gas company whose sales were sub-
ject to FPC jurisdiction.39 A Congressional effort to overturn this decision was 
vetoed by President Eisenhower in 1956, but it would be several years before 
the FPC began actively regulating natural gas prices.40 
While the strict regulation of oil prices in the 1970s was designed to be tem-
porary and was enacted in a time of impending crisis, the regulation of natural 
gas prices in the 1960s was intended to be permanent, and those efforts were 
made when plentiful supplies of natural gas existed.41 An explanation can be 
found in the differences between the fuels and the industries that emerged to 
produce them. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, the natural gas 
industry was less concentrated than the oil industry. Vertical integration offered 
fewer cost savings from economies of scale in natural gas as the technology 
was less complicated and the supply more stable. Moreover, most gas was 
discovered and produced by oil companies that did want to integrate forward so 
                                                          
35  ‘Real reason behind fuel crisis’ 1973. 
36  P.L 75-668, 52 Stat. 821. 
37  After two contradictory high profile reports by the FPC, natural gas consumers had lined up 
against precluding the FPC the authority to regulate well head prices. Truman 1950; the 
Leland Olds affair no doubt contributed to Truman’s willingness to veto the bill.  
38  Federal Power Commission 1953. 
39  Phillips Petroleum Company v. State of Wisconsin, 374 U.S. 672. 
40  On the day the Senate passed the bill a Senator announced that he had been offered a bribe 
in return for his vote. While expressing support for the legislation Eisenhower vetoed it, al-
luding to the necessity of maintaining the “integrity of governmental processes.” Eisenhow-
er 1956.  
41  I use the term “strict regulation” to differentiate from the fact that while pro-rationing and 
the import quota effectively set a floor and ceiling for oil prices, until the 1970s the federal 
government did not explicitly set oil prices. 
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as to avoid being regulated by the FPC.42 But while oil could be transported by 
pipeline, rail, ship, and trucks, natural gas could only be moved by pipeline. 
This tied natural gas producers to their customers in a way that did not apply to 
oil producers and their refiners and end users. Merchant pipeline companies 
physically tied producers to utilities who distributed the gas to end users for 
heating and cooking or used it to generate electricity. While the natural gas 
industry as a whole was less concentrated than the oil industry, there could and 
did exist significant concentration within particular natural gas fields, thereby 
potentially granting monopolistic pricing power to producers.43  
Two additional facts supported natural gas price regulation. First, until the 
1960s it was widely believed that natural gas was discovered only as an adjunct 
to oil exploration. Therefore, the price of natural gas would not directly affect 
its supply.44 Second, the utility companies that purchased natural gas from the 
merchant pipeline companies were regulated by state utility commissions. The 
merchant pipeline companies that bought the gas from producers and sold it to 
utility companies were regulated by the FPC. Neither of these actors was free 
to charge whatever the market might bear; the very existence of this regulation 
was a recognition that pipelines, like power lines, were most efficiently run by 
publicly regulated monopolies. It could be seen as only a matter of time before 
this logic ran upstream to the natural gas producers.  
After determining that a cost-based company-by-company system of rate 
making (common in the regulation of the utility industry) was administratively 
impossible to determine, the FPC settled upon a system of cost-based area 
rates.45 The FPC chose as its test case the Permian Basin (a large oil and gas 
field in west Texas) where it set rates in 1965; these were upheld by the Su-
preme Court in 1968.46 In 1968, for the first time, the unregulated intrastate 
price of natural gas rose above the regulated interstate price for natural gas. The 
price for gas within the state in which it was produced had always been lower 
(and less attractive to a producer) than shipping it to consumers in another 
state. Intrastate gas was cheaper because transportation costs were lower and 
the existence of a greater number of smaller producers increased competition 
thereby putting downward pressure on price. But the price increase for intra-
state gas (which was not subject to FPC regulation) revealed that the demand 
for new gas was exceeding available supply.47 As this trend continued, produc-
ers worked to service intrastate pipelines and markets at the expense of the 
                                                          
42  Neuner 1960, 5-18.  
43  Neuner 1960, 35-42. 
44  Federal Power Commission 1965, 325-7. 
45  On the eve of the Phillips decision there were more than four thousand independent natural 
gas producers in the United States. The sheer size of the industry made linking prices to the 
costs incurred by each company an administrative nightmare. Castaneda 1999, 154.  
46  See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747. 
47  Vietor 1984, 160. 
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interstate market. At the same time, as Figure 3 indicates, the reserve to pro-
duction ratio for natural gas had been declining since 1958, meaning the coun-
try was producing more natural gas than it was discovering. All this resulted in 
physical shortages. The FPC was forced to develop criteria for the rationing of 
natural gas beginning in 1971.48 These shortages intensified over the course of 
the 1970s resulting in the plant closings, lay-offs, and interruptions in service 
described at the beginning of this section. 49 
Figure 3: Reserve to Production Ratio for Natural Gas, 1949-2010 
 
Sources: From 1949-1976: American Petroleum Institute and American Gas Association Data: 
American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association, and Canadian Petroleum Association 
(published jointly), Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids and Natural Gas in the United 
States and Canada as of December 31, 1979, Volume 34 (June 1980). From 1977-2008: EIA, 
U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves, annual reports. From 2009-2010: 
EIA, Summary: U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves 2010 (August 
2012), Tables 7 and 17. 
 
Similar to the oil crisis, there are two competing explanations for the natural 
gas shortages of the 1970s. As the above narrative implies, first, while natural 
gas prices were held relatively stable by the FPC, the costs of exploring for and 
producing natural gas (plus inflation) reduced its profitability and resulted in a 
declining supply. Essentially, by 1970 natural gas prices were set at rates prem-
ised on antiquated cost estimates. At the same time, relatively cheap and stable 
natural gas prices helped the fuel to penetrate industrial markets. Growing 
                                                          
48  The FPC approached the problem of rationing on a case by case basis in 1971. Eventually the 
Commission issued more general regulations. See Federal Power Commission. 1973a; Vietor 
1984, 276-7. 
49  One example can be seen in the difficulty experienced by Consolidated Edison of New York 
(the City of New York’s utility) in meeting its natural gas demand. ‘Gas Shortage is Pinching 
Con Edison’ 1971; ‘FPC is Urged to Take Action’ 1971. 
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suburbanization and the increasing attractiveness of the fuel for utility compa-
nies concerned about air pollution also served to increase demand, resulting in 
the shortages of the 1970s.50 A second explanation posits that the natural gas 
industry conspired to create a crisis in order to circumvent regulation and 
achieve higher prices. These critics were suspicious of the fact that the reserve 
to production ratio turned negative shortly after the Supreme Court found in 
1954 that natural gas prices could be set by the FPC for producers, and the 
price of intrastate gas rose above interstate gas in 1968, the very year that the 
Supreme Court for the first time upheld FPC rates. These critics were not just 
consumer groups, but also included a number of former FPC commissioners.51 
My purpose is not to determine which explanation is more persuasive. But it is 
important to note that growing natural gas shortages existed before the OAPEC 
embargo of 1973.52 Furthermore, these shortages and the natural gas crisis of 
the 1970s would have materialized (whether as a result of market forces or 
conspiracy) even in the absence of an OAPEC embargo.53 
4.  The Electrical Energy Crisis 
In May 1974, Charles Luce stood in the glass-walled visitors’ gallery of the 
New York State legislature, gazing down at the floor while nervously rubbing 
his hands.54 Luce was the CEO of Consolidated Edison of New York, the utility 
servicing New York City and Westchester County. He had spent the night 
lobbying legislators. Now, at 6 a.m. after a twenty-hour session, he watched as 
the Republican-controlled legislature passed a half billion dollar bailout of his 
company amid jeers from Democrats.55 This was the first time that a state had 
taken such action to preserve a major public utility, and it likely prevented the 
nation’s largest private utility company from having to declare bankruptcy. 
How was it possible that a company with a monopoly on the sale of natural gas 
and electricity in the nation’s largest city, an entity permitted to create a rate 
                                                          
50  MacAvoy and Pindyck 1975a, 7-9; MacAvoy and Pindyck 1975b, 27-8; Federal Power Com-
mission 1973b, 563. 
51  See Joseph Swindler’s testimony in U.S. Congress, House 1971, 271. 
52  These shortages increased over the course of the 1970s even as natural gas surpluses devel-
oped within producer states. On the growing surplus within Texas see Prindle 1981, 103-4. 
53  This is not to suggest that the OPEC-induced price spikes of the 1970s did not have an 
impact on the debate surrounding domestic US natural gas prices. Consumer groups argued 
against efforts by natural gas producers to raise interstate prices to match intrastate levels. 
They believed that producers were misguided to point out that natural gas demand slack-
ened only when gas reached the Btu-equivalent of oil prices, since oil prices were a reflec-
tion not of a free market but a cartel. Vietor 1984, 288. 
54  This account borrows from Lifset 2014a. 
55  ‘Albany Approves $500-Million Aid’ 1974; ‘Area Lawmakers Oppose State’ 1974; ‘Con Ed 
Sale’ 1974.  
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structure designed to guarantee a rate of return on its investment, could find 
itself on the brink of bankruptcy? The answer is that Con Ed was painfully 
experiencing a series of problems endemic throughout the American utility 
industry during these years. These problems constitute what I refer to here as 
the “electrical energy crisis.”  
American utility companies found themselves in financial difficulty because 
the business model they had relied on for the first six decades of the twentieth 
century was falling apart. The historian Richard Hirsh has argued these compa-
nies had long been successful in encouraging demand while expanding supply 
and reducing the price of electricity by building increasingly larger power 
plants, thereby taking advantage of economies of scale. But this model broke 
down in the 1970s for three reasons: technological stasis, the environmental 
movement and the oil and natural gas crisis.56  
The ability to build larger, more efficient plants hit a technological wall in 
the 1970s. For decades, greater efficiencies had been possible by building 
larger plants producing greater economies of scale. The advances can be seen 
in the successful efforts to improve thermal efficiency (the percentage of a 
fuel’s energy content actually converted into electricity). Yet, thermodynamic 
theory limited steam systems to a top efficiency of 48 percent. Thomas Edi-
son’s first generating station, built in 1882, had a thermal efficiency of 2.5 
percent. By 1965 the average thermal efficiency was 33 percent. Efficiencies 
were gained by increasing steam temperatures and pressures. In the 1960s, 
manufacturers began to discover that improving thermal efficiency was produc-
ing diminishing returns, with metallurgical problems appearing at around 40 
percent. Manufacturers and utilities learned that less-efficient plants could be 
run more reliably.57 Hoping to overcome the decline of thermal efficiency 
improvements and meet increasing demand, utility companies tried building 
larger power plants. Lacking the time to test and slowly introduce larger tur-
bines, manufacturers extrapolated from existing designs and produced equip-
ment that frequently broke down. Utility companies were in a race to keep up 
with demand, and they were losing.58 
                                                          
56  Richard Hirsh described the crisis as the breakdown of a “utility consensus”; see Hirsh 1999. 
On how utility companies encouraged demand, see Rose 1995, and Platt 1991; New York 
City’s utility, Consolidated Edison, was also caught in a financial crisis resulting from a vi-
cious cycle in which rising interest rates and increasing demand for electricity led to high-
priced construction requiring new financing at higher interest rates. This meant higher rates 
to consumers to cover the interest and attract new investment. The Public Service Corpora-
tion, its regulator, generally gave the company a percentage of its requested rate hikes, 
producing a gradual financial erosion. Higher fuel prices in the 1970s drove the company to 
the brink of bankruptcy. See Pratt 1988, 91. 
57  Hirsh 1999, 55-6. 
58  Hirsh 1999, 58; Nuclear energy, powered by domestically mined uranium and free (for a 
time) from environmental controversy was the last hope of the growth strategy. To under-
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Environmentalism also played a role in producing the electrical utility crisis. 
Before the 1960s, utility companies enjoyed almost complete autonomy in 
choosing production and transmission technologies, the fuel used in their sys-
tems, the location of generating plants, and the type of air and water pollution 
control systems they chose to employ. The historian Joseph Pratt has noted that 
by the 1970s utilities had lost this autonomy as new environmental laws and 
regulations scrutinized and slowed the ability of utility companies to build new 
plants and determine the fuels used to generate electricity. Perhaps most im-
portant, environmentalism questioned the growth-centered ideology and busi-
ness model of the industry. Increasing power consumption had long been 
viewed as critical to the growth of the overall economy; as the historian David 
Nye has argued, it literally fueled the American way of life.59 Environmental-
ists were attracted to those critics who called into question this ideology of 
growth. Paul Ehrlich, Ernst F. Schumacher, Denis Meadows, Barry Commoner, 
and Amory Lovins all provided the intellectual ammunition, which environ-
mentalists used to focus the attention of utility companies on the demand for 
energy.60 The effect of this discourse is that it placed utility companies and 
their environmental critics in starkly different positions. Utility companies 
responded to the blackouts by arguing that they needed more generating power. 
To environmental critics, this solution, and the mind-set that produced it, was 
the problem. But it should be noted that environmentalists attacked utilities 
because a large number of environmental problems are energy related. And 
though expanding energy production did garner the attention of conservation-
ists hoping to preserve a particular stretch of river or the sanctity of the national 
park system in the first half of the twentieth century, it was during the post-
World War II years, during an intensifying interest in pollution that utility 
companies found themselves in the crosshairs of environmentalists.61  
Finally, the oil and natural gas crisis contributed to an electricity crisis pre-
cisely because of the pressure applied by environmentalists to the utility indus-
try. In the 1960s and early 70s, utility companies began to use ever larger quan-
tities of oil and natural gas to generate electricity. By 1973, 17 percent of the 
nation’s electricity generation was produced by burning oil; 18 percent was 
produced burning natural gas.62 Both of these fuels were relatively cheap in the 
                                                                                                                                
stand how nuclear power became increasingly controversial in the U.S. during the 1970s see 
Walker 2014. 
59  See Nye 1999. 
60  See Pratt 1988, 255; Ehrlich 1968; Schumacher 1973; Meadows and the Club of Rome 1972; 
Commoner 1976; Lovins 1976. 
61  Utility companies were attacked in the early 20th century by environmental activists’ intent 
on reducing air pollution. This paper argues that the pressure on utility companies increased 
considerably in the post-war decades. On these earlier efforts to reduce air pollution see 
Stradling 1999. 
62  U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 8.2a.  
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1960s. FPC regulation had kept natural gas prices relatively flat across that 
decade, and domestically produced oil dropped 25 percent in price from 1957 
to 1970.63 Oil and natural gas are also cleaner burning than coal, an important 
consideration for urban utility companies striving to meet new air pollution 
requirements.64  
When natural gas shortages materialized in the 1970s, utilities like Consoli-
dated Edison had difficulty acquiring all the natural gas they needed. Further-
more, the FPC approved price increases in the 1970s, as part of an effort to 
encourage new production. At the very moment when American utilities were 
beginning to switch away from coal to oil, they were confronted with OPEC 
price increases and the OAPEC embargo, both of which served to drastically 
raise fuel costs. With these kinds of costs, electricity prices would no longer 
decline. As a result of these three issues (technological stasis, environmental-
ism, and the oil and natural gas crisis) utility companies lost the ability to meet 
demand while lowering prices.65 In Con Ed’s case, simply meeting demand 
became a significant challenge.66 To be sure, the OAPEC embargo and the 
swift rise in oil prices during the 1970s played a role in undermining the busi-
ness model of utility companies in this era. However, oil was quickly aban-
doned as a fuel source by the industry in the 1970s, and technological stasis, 
environmentalism, and the crisis in oil and natural gas together were sufficient 
to produce an ongoing crisis in the utility industry.67 The electrical energy crisis 
was exacerbated by but not a product of OPEC or the OAPEC embargo.  
5.  Conclusion 
While this paper has attempted to demonstrate that the energy crisis of the 
1970s consisted of three separate but related crises, this was not how the crisis 
was understood at the time. This confusion contributed to the paranoia and fear 
of a citizenry buffeted by a series of traumatic shocks and undergoing signifi-
cant change. But understanding that the American energy crisis consisted of 
three separate but related crises provides a number of new insights into the 
direction of energy policy and politics in the 1970s. First, it helps us to make 
sense of the policies debated and enacted in Washington in that decade. There 
were a number of debates (i.e. natural gas de-regulation) and controversies that 
                                                          
63  U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 3.1. 
64  For a discussion of the the stricter air pollution requirements emerging in these years see 
Dewey 2000. 
65  Hirsh 1999, 60-1. 
66  On Consolidated Edison’s difficulties in the 1960s and ‘70s see Lifset 2014b. 
67  The market share of oil in electricity generation declined from 17 percent in 1973 to 6 
percent in 1983. U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 8.2a. 
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had nothing to do with oil and the oil crisis. Second, while OAPEC and OPEC 
contributed to the crisis, they also became convenient scapegoats. One of the 
effects of blaming the Middle East was that it empowered consumers in their 
struggle with producers over price controls. It was easier to defend price con-
trols if lifting them meant that undemocratic regimes would thereby benefit 
from their cartelistic pricing power. Third, the above dynamic likely slowed 
down the pace of neo-liberal reforms that eventually took place at the end of 
the decade.68 The 1970s saw large swaths of the American economy (i.e. trans-
portation, communications) de-regulated as policy makers placed greater faith 
in the market. However, the shortages described in this paper and the degree to 
which they might be mistakenly blamed on a foreign cartel provided support 
for continued and increasing government involvement in the energy sector. 
Fourth, it allows us to see that the oil crisis continues to dominate our memory 
of the energy crisis partly because the policies designed to address the natural 
gas and electrical utility crises were largely successful, while the policies de-
signed to address the oil crisis were not. Americans see the energy crisis 
through the failures inherent in an oil policy that by the 1980s came to rely on 
the free market (with a near exclusive focus on supply and not demand) and, 
since a growing percentage of that market was met with foreign supply, oil 
became an increasingly important national security concern.69  
Finally, much of the scholarship on the 1970s predictably focuses on the 
impact of the energy crisis on that decade. Beyond the inflation, gasoline lines 
and conspiracy theories, a more precise understanding of the energy crisis of 
the 1970s will allow us to see how the policies adopted at that time have 
worked to influence and shape the succeeding decades. A more precise under-
standing of the crisis will allow us to better understand both our contemporary 
challenges and the burden of the past.  
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